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     ABSTRACT 
This paper addresses the problem of estimating the aggregate international demand 
schedule for emerging market (EM) securities as an asset class. The standard ‘push-pull’ 
model of capital flows is modified by reference to recent work on portfolio choice in the 
context of credit rationing leading to a simultaneous equation model that determines EM 
yield and capital flows together. Interaction effects include lagged flows and yields to 
reflect herding and asset bubbles, with a time-varying risk aversion variable affecting 
yields and flows. This model is then tested on monthly data for US bond purchases, using 
the General-to-Specific Approach (GETS) to find significant variables, lags, and shock 
dummies for yield spread and bond flows separately; followed by a Full Information 
Maximum Likelihood (FIML) estimation of the two equations together. The results are 
robust and give a very good fit for both yields and flows, contributing a valuable insight 
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             April  2003 1.INTRODUCTION 
∗  
 
The expansion and contraction of portfolio capital flows from the global financial centres 
towards emerging markets over the past decade has generated considerable controversy 
over the underlying economic determinants of these flows, and by extension their 
instability. Most research has focused on the conditions in emerging markets themselves  
- often known as ‘fundamentals’- rather than the determinants of the demand for 
emerging market securities as an asset class.
1 None the less, recent academic literature 
has begun to emphasise ‘home market’ factors such as US interest rates, changing risk 
appetite, herding behaviour and momentum trading as key determinants of flows.  
 
However, attempts to model these flows have revealed difficulties in separating home 
from host factors - or ‘push’ and ‘pull’ effects as they are conventionally known – 
because aggregate flows and yield spreads do not simply reflect an underlying process of 
portfolio allocation based on known risk and return characteristics of emerging markets 
in relation to wealth and riskless return on the investors’ own market. This is because: 
first, capital flows themselves affect asset prices both directly (asset bubbles) and 
indirectly (default risk); second, the changing level of investor risk appetite on the home 
market affects both asset prices and capital flows; and third, international capital markets 
                                                 
∗ The authors acknowledge financial support from the Department for International Development under the 
CSSR ‘Globalisation and Poverty’ Research Programme. We would like to thank Ashoka Mody for 
valuable guidance on data sources; and Angela Cozzini of Cross-Border Capital for EM liquidity figures. 
1 For a discussion of the role of these factors in the context of capital market instability during the late 
1990’s, see FitzGerald (2002). 
  2do not fully clear – in the sense that at the unconstrained market price, some borrowers 
remain unsatisfied.
2      
 
In this paper, we attempt to encompass these three characteristics in an empirically 
testable model of capital flows. Section 2 reviews the recent literature which has found 
that home or ‘international’ factors are at least as significant as host factors or 
‘fundamentals’ in determining not only capital flows themselves but also asset yields and 
credit ratings. The ‘push-pull model’ that underpins most econometric work in this field 
is discussed in Section 3, which suggests that the reduced form commonly used for 
estimation may fail to fully identify asset demand effects in a rationed market such as the 
observed inverse relationship between yields on EM assets and flows on the one hand, 
and of the correlation between these yields and those of other high-risk assets on home 
markets on the other. Moreover, only very recently have disequilibrium concepts been 
introduced to the push-pull model by Mody and Taylor (2002). Section 4 sets out our 
proposed model of the asset demand schedule based on a simultaneous equation system 
that determines yield spreads and capital flows with explicit inclusion of interaction 
effects. The two equations include lagged flows and yields to reflect herding and asset 
bubbles, with a risk aversion variable in both yield spread (to reflect asset pricing) and 
capital flows (to reflect credit rationing). This model is then tested on data for monthly 
bond flows from the US to emerging markets over the 1993-2001 period in Section 5. 
The results of a general-to-specific (GETS) econometric approach to the separate time 
series for yield spreads and bond flows, and of full information maximum likelihood 
(FIML) estimation of the two equations together, are robust and support the proposed 
                                                 
2 See Stiglitz and Weiss (1992). 
  3model. Section 6 concludes with some suggestions for further research, and draws some 
tentative policy implications in relation to the stabilization of fluctuations in demand  
for emerging market assets. 
 
2. CAPITAL FLOWS AND THE IMPLICIT ASSET DEMAND SCHEDULE  
 
The macroeconomic theory of international capital markets is still in its infancy, in 
marked contrast to the sophistication of the microeconomics of portfolio choice. Sticky 
prices, market segmentation, heterogeneous investors, persistent currency misalignments 
despite arbitrage and the cost of scarce information all need to be accounted for if the 
model is even to approximate the real world in a useful way (Dumas, 1994). In 
consequence, the relatively simple framework which combines international (push) and 
domestic (pull) factors in determining the capital flow to any one country still dominates 
empirical work. This approach reflects, in essence, a simple microeconomic portfolio 
composition rule based on given relative returns and risks of various assets, but without 
significant macroeconomic interaction at the aggregate level.  
 
The relevant literature starts in the early 1990s, when the surge of capital flows to 
emerging markets got underway. On the basis of the observed comovement of Latin 
American reserves and exchange rates (as a proxy for capital flows), Calvo, Leiderman 
and Reinhart (1993) - using principal components analysis and structural VAR - conclude 
that common external shocks are a major determinant of capital inflows, which in turn 
  4lead to reserve accumulation and exchange rate appreciation.
3 Fernandez-Arias (1996) 
uses a panel of thirteen developing countries to address the determination of country risk 
as the channel through which exogenous shocks are transmitted to portfolio inflows, 
finding that external (‘push’) factors have a substantial impact on creditworthiness as 
reflected in the secondary market debt prices. Montiel and Reinhart (1999) employ fixed-
effects panel data analysis for 15 emerging market countries and examine the volume and 
composition of capital inflows. They conclude that international interest rates have an 
important effect on not only the volume but also the asset composition of flows. Montiel 
and Reinhart (2001) confirm the influence of US interest rates but argue that there are 
also step effects at work due to the progressive integration of international capital 
markets, which go beyond separate ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors. Finally, Mody, Taylor and 
Kim (2001) use a vector equilibrium correction model to forecast pull and push factors 
for inflows to 32 developing countries of bond, equity and syndicated loans. Push factors 
include US growth, US interest rates (short and long-term) and the US high-yield spread 
as a proxy for risk aversion. They conclude that in general, pull factors are more 
important in the long-run but that push factors are determinant in short-run dynamics.
4 
 
The country level approach in these articles has the disadvantage that the push factors 
may be underestimated because flows from all host countries are included but only US  
 
                                                 
3 However, Chuhan, Claessens, Mamingi (1998) show that reserves are only weakly correlated with 
portfolio capital flows, and so should not be used as a proxy. 
4 However, they treat bond yields (i.e.the EMBI) as an exogenous variable, implicitly assuming that yields 
are unaffected by the capital flows themselves: this may lead to an underestimation of the strength of asset 
demand fluctuations. 
  5factors are considered. In consequence, some authors have examined the capital outflows 
to emerging markets from the US alone. Taylor and Sarno (1997) examine the 
determinants of US portfolio capital outflows towards Latin America and Asia using 
cointegration techniques. They find that global (‘push’) and domestic (‘pull’) factors have 
similar importance in explaining short-run equity flows to Asia and Latin America. 
However, for the short-run dynamics of bond flows, global factors (particularly U.S. 
interest rates) are found to be more important than domestic factors. Chuhan, Claessens, 
Mamingi (1998) model US portfolio flows to Latin American and Asian markets using 
panel data method. They find, in contrast, that push factors (the slowdown in US 
industrial production and the drop in US interest rates) are the main determinants of 
portfolio flows to Latin America and Asia. However, while equity flows are more 
sensitive to global ‘push’ factors, bond flows are found to react more to credit ratings and 
secondary market price of debt.  
 
The only attempt to model asset demand and supply effects in conjunction is an 
innovative disequilibrium model of capital flows to four emerging markets – Brazil, 
Mexico, Thailand and Korea - in Mody and Taylor (2002). They derive this model from 
the Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) theory of credit rationing, which allows for such market 
disequilibria explicitly. Using the maximum likelihood estimation technique, they 
estimate supply and demand functions for capital flows jointly for each country. The 
technique estimates the probability of the demand for capital exceeding the supply at any 
one point in time, which the authors term a ‘capital crunch’. The global 'push' factors 
include: short-term and long-term US interest rates, the US high yield spread (to proxy 
  6the default risk in the US), a measure of industrialized country economic activity (proxied 
by an index of US industrial production), and the cost of capital (EMBI of spreads over 
the US risk-free rate). Pull factors (the ‘demand for capital’) considered include the 
international cost of capital as proxied by the EMBI, domestic stock market indices and 
reserve levels. They find that the supply of capital (i.e. push effect) operates through two 
distinct channels: first, US industrial production growth raises the supply of capital; 
second, increased US high-yield spreads reduce the supply of capital to emerging 
markets. This second effect is interpreted by the authors as reflecting an increase in the 
cost of risk capital, which in turn is expressed in the EM yield spread (proxied by the 
EMBI). 
 
This model marks a significant step forward from the single-equation push-pull model, 
particularly the explicit handling of capital rationing. However, there are two aspects 
where our approach differs from that of Mody and Taylor. First, the negative impact of 
the US high yield spread on flows to emerging markets indicates that what is being 
captured is changes in risk aversion, not US default risk as such, because in portfolio 
theory increased risk in one asset should increase demand for other assets. Second, the 
inclusion of yield spread as an independent variable in their capital demand function 
overlooks the fact that flows can clearly affect spreads inversely. In other words, flows 
and spreads should be modelled simultaneously. 
 
As we have seen, the literature on bond flows takes the yield spread itself to be an 
exogenous factor. However, there is also a recent literature on the determination of EM 
  7bond spreads themselves. Eichengreen and Mody (1998) use a ‘standard model ’of 
spreads as a function of global economic conditions (proxied by the rate on ten-year U.S. 
treasuries), issuer characteristics such as the region of the borrower and whether it is 
sovereign, and country characteristics. They find that a rise in U.S. interest rates is 
associated with a lower probability of a bond issue (i.e primary supply estimates) while 
reducing spreads. In contrast, Min (1998) finds no effect of U.S. T-bill rates on yield 
spreads for EM dollar bonds, but points out that bond rates (unlike syndicated bank debt) 
are not tied to US short rates. The International Monetary Fund introduces market 
expectations in suggesting that “the stance and predictability of U.S. monetary policy is 
important in explaining fluctuations in developing country interest rate spreads” (IMF 
2000: 68). Arora and Cerisola (2000) estimate the influence on country risk (proxied by 
sovereign bond spreads) of U.S. monetary policy, host fundamentals, and world capital 
market conditions. They point out that the ambiguous results in the literature may be due 
to proxying U.S. monetary policy by the yield on Treasury securities. When the U.S. 
Federal Funds target rate is used, they find direct positive effects on sovereign bond 
spreads, as theory anticipates. However, this particular literature does not seem to take 
into account the effect of capital flows themselves as asset prices and debt levels, and 






  83. PUSH-PULL MODELS OF CAPITAL FLOWS 
 
The standard model used in the empirical literature
5 states that the portfolio capital flow 
(Fij) from any one country of origin (i) to a country of destination (j) is the result of 
‘push’ and ‘pull factors’, or ‘capital supply’ and ‘country characteristics’. For a vector of 
known home country (or international market) variables w and host country variables h 
then , 
 
  Fij=F(wi ,hj) 
 
Push factors (w) conventionally include: home country wealth (e.g. GDP); home 
monetary policy (e.g. money supply); riskless home interest rate (e.g. US treasury yield); 
and home asset risk (e.g. US bond yield spread) The econometric literature indicates that 
roughly half of the observed flow variance can be explained by these factors.  Pull factors 
(h) usually include: EM yield spreads (or EMBI prices); risk ratings; host country growth 
rates and debt levels etc. One of these country characteristics (such as credit rating) may 
have a separate estimation equation involving further exogenous variables –such as 
Fernandez-Arias (1996). 
 
At first sight, single-equation ‘push-pull’ models might seem to be the reduced form of a  
simultaneous equation model where demand (Fd ) is a function of host characteristics (w) 
                                                 
5 See Jeanneau and Micu (2002) for an excellent literature survey of these models and Fernandez-Arias and 
Montiel (1996) for the microeconomic theory underpinning the expected returns and risk factors that 
determine creditworthiness.  
  9and the return or ‘price’ (P), while supply (Fs ) of these assets is a function of host 
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The existence of exogenous variables (w,h) in the two equations means that there would 
be no identification problem as such.
6  However, the three coefficients (f) in the reduced 
form that is usually estimated do not in fact correspond to the original response 
coefficients (b) for the supply and demand functions and should not be interpreted as 
such.
7 Specifically, the price response from the demand schedule (c1) is included in the 
measured effect (f2) of host characteristics on flows. In our context, the observed inverse 
correlation between yield spreads and capital flows indicates that the risk information 
included in yield is more important than the underlying expected return information, and  
the valuation of this risk depends on risk appetite in the home market as well as default  
risks as such. The implication is that it is necessary to estimate the flow and yield  
schedules separately and then handle the simultaneity problem explicitly, if we are to  
determine the ‘push’ factors (w) correctly. 
 
  10More seriously, the implicit Fs equation is not in fact a supply schedule for assets as such 
because the decisions of primary issuance (e.g. by EM treasuries) in response to price are 
unknown, and in any case as much affected by market access as by yield spreads as such, 
as Eichengreen and Mody (1998) point out. The ‘pull’ factors (h) contain information 
about the quality of the asset (expected return, default risk etc.), not the quantity supplied. 
Indeed, as there is an active secondary market, EM bond purchases by (say) US investors 
may be ‘supplied’ by (say) Japanese disinvestors. Moreover, the fundamentals (h) such as 
debt overhang and growth rates are not truly independent variables but are in fact affected 
by flows themselves through debt accumulation and asset bubbles; so default 
probabilities depend on past and present flows. In other words, h = h(F).  
 
Finally, EM bond markets are rationed at equilibrium in the sense that prices are 
unconstrained but the market does not clear because EMs would like to borrow more (i.e. 
supply more assets) at the going price than investors are willing to lend (i.e. purchase 
assets). The implications of this are clearly set out by Folkerts-Landau (1985), who 
extends the familiar model of rationed credit markets to international debt. Higher 
lending rates have an adverse selection effect on borrowers, increasing the default risk 
along with higher levels of indebtedness. With imperfect information, full pricing of 
assets to reflect risk is impossible, and entire asset classes are thus ‘rationed out’ of the 
debt market. In consequence, there is a backward-sloping supply curve of funds beyond a 
certain interest rate; and in this range the lenders’ profit-maximising level of credit is 
lower than developing countries’ demand for external finance.   
                                                                                                                                                 
6 See Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991, chapter 11) ‘Simultaneous-equation estimation’. 
7 Nor, indeed, can they be derived again from the reduced form. 
  11In sum, the macroeconomic ‘push-pull’ model is in effect a representation of shifts in the 
demand schedule for EM assets, with the ‘fundamentals’ reflecting asset quality. This 
notion informs the model we estimate below. 
 
4. PROPOSED MODELLING APPROACH 
 
The microeconomic logic of investment behaviour in response to particular financial 
incentives also has consequences for the pricing of developing country assets, quite 
independently of the underlying fundamentals.
8  Moreover, asset valuation methods and 
portfolio composition rules used by investors in practice tend to be rather crude, being 
largely based on considerations of liquidity and exit possibilities (Clark, Levasseu and 
Rousseau, 1993). The resulting asset bubbles can have a serious impact on the real 
economy in both developed and developing countries even in the presence of low 
inflation, fiscal balance and monetary rectitude (IMF, 2000).  
 
There are thus severe limitations to the use of yield spreads on emerging market bonds as  
evidence of markets perception of asset quality in the form of underlying default risk: 
“care is needed in interpreting yield spreads, since they are influenced by a variety of 
factors other than the perceived creditworthiness of the borrower including investors’  
                                                 
8 See IMF (1995) – in particular Section 5 (pp. 37-44) ‘Institutional investor behaviour and the pricing of 
developing country stocks’.  Recent work on herding by investors indicates that three causes can be 
involved. First, payoff externalities where payoff to an agent adopting an action is positively related to the 
number of agents adopting the same action. Second, principle-agent considerations such that a manager, in 
order to maintain or gain reputation when markets are imperfectly informed, may prefer either to ‘hide in 
the herd’ to avoid evaluation or ‘ride the herd’ in order to improve reputation. And third, information 
cascades where later agents, inferring information from the actions of prior agents, optimally decide to 
ignore their own information (Devenow and Welck, 1996).  
  12appetite for risk and the liquidity of particular instruments” (Cunningham, Dixon and 
Hayes, 2001, p.175). Moreover, despite the fact that yield dispersion has increased over 
time as well as increasing after crises, which can be interpreted as growing investor 
discrimination in a cumulative learning process, it is still the case that beyond investment 
grade
9, the relationship between risk (as reflected in ratings) and price (reflected in yield 
spreads) tends to break down – particularly during droughts when credit rationing reduces 
transactions volume severely.  
 
Clearly higher home interest rates, lower volatility in home assets, higher covariance 
between these and emerging market assets, and higher risk aversion will all reduce 
demand for emerging market assets independently of the supply conditions (Disyatat and 
Gelos, 2001). Further, pervasive herding behaviour causes a 'momentum' effect in which 
demand for an asset becomes a positive function of the quantity (capital flow) itself. 
There is thus good reason to see risk aversion (or ‘risk appetite’) as a variable in itself 
which is not only changing but also path dependent, varying with past experience of 
yields and bubbles and thus potentially strongly pro-cyclical. For instance, the IMF 
recognises that risk appetite changes over time in practice, and uses for this purpose the 




                                                 
9 According to the Bank of England, the spread/rating curve tends to the origin, moves through 250 basis 
points at Moody’s A2 and 500 basis points at B3, becoming asymptotic to infinity beyond B3 
(Cunningham, Dixon and Hayes, 2001). 
10 The Bank of England, however, warns that “it is difficult to construct robust indicators of risk appetite” 
because of the problem of separating out the effects of pure contagion and underlying fundamentals in 
aggregate indicators (Cunningham, Dixon and Hayes, 2001, p.185). 
  13Econometric analysis of US mutual fund portfolios shows that their momentum trading in  
emerging market equities is positive – they systematically buy winners and sell losers 
(Kaminsky et al. 2000). Contemporaneous momentum (buying winners and selling 
losers) is stronger during crises; lagged momentum trading (buying past winners and 
selling past losers) is stronger during non-crises. Investors also engage in contagion 
trading: that is they sell assets from one country when asset prices fall in another. In a 
similar vein, Disyatat and Gelos (2001) find that benchmarking explains observed 
behaviour of dedicated US mutual funds better than a rebalancing rule implied by the 
standard mean-variance optimisation model, but do not explore variations in risk aversion 
over time.  
 
Kumar and Persaud (2001) point out that changes in risk appetite (and the implications 
for contagion) have received comparatively little attention in the academic literature, 
even though discussed in market and policy circles. They argue that most of the 
indicators used to proxy risk aversion in the empirical literature confuse the level of risk 
itself with risk appetite: spreads are a function (K) of risk, where K reflects risk appetite, 
itself containing structural components (the underlying utility function and financial 
market structure) and a time varying element reflecting shorter-term factors such as so-
called ‘wake-up calls’. In their model, risk is proxied by the variance of the asset price 
(σ
2) and the expected return is then: 
 
E(R) = α + K log (σ
2)     
 
  14where E(R) is the expected return, α is a measure of ‘global’ risk, and K is risk aversion. 
They define the expected excess return as the difference between the long price LR(P) 
and the current price of the asset: 
 
LR(P) - P = α + K log(σ
2)     or 
P = LR (P) - α - K log σ
2       
 
Clearly, not only does a fall in risk appetite
11  (increased K) cause a fall in asset price (P) 
for a given risk level (σ), but also the impact on price will be greater for riskier asset 
classes (higher σ). Applying this argument to our context, to the extent that home risk 
aversion is reflected in US risk spreads, then the same change in risk appetite would be 
reflected in EM spreads, as well as in the aggregate flows due to the capital market 
rationing effect. As we have seen, the empirical literature does report this effect, but 
without a clear explanation.  
 
In sum, therefore, we propose an approach where shifts in the asset demand function 
dominate, and thus our model for empirical testing should have the following five 
characteristics:  
 
                                                 
11 Kumar and Persaud estimate risk appetite (K) from this model by calculating excess returns (the 
difference between spot rates and forward rates from the previous period) on seventeen emerging market 
currencies over ten years. Their risk appetite index exhibits marked quarterly and annual cycles, and 
troughs that appear to be correlated with major market discontinuities. 
  151.  Spreads impact flows negatively because of the risk information they contain; 
while flows impact spreads negatively because increased demand drives up the 
price; 
2.  Risk aversion varies over time, and affects flows negatively due to asymmetric 
rationing, and yield spreads positively due to risk pricing; 
3.  There are lagged effect of past on present flows due to momentum trading, and 
past on present spreads due to asset bubbles; 
4.  The familiar home variables such as riskless return and wealth (or liquidity) and 
host variables to reflect fundamentals such as real return and probability of 
default, are included; 
5.  A simultaneous equation system to capture the interaction of price (yield spread) 
and quantity (capital flow) in equilibrium.   
 
This leads us to a proposed model structure of the following form. Capital flows (F) 
depend upon its lagged self (with a structure to be determined empirically); the EM yield 
spread (S); wealth/liquidity (L), riskless return (I) and risk aversion (R) in the home 
























α α α α α α t t t t t t R I L S F F
 
 
  16Yield spread (S) depends upon its lagged self; capital flows (F); home risk aversion (R ) 
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5. EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION OF THE MODEL 
 
5.1.  Data 
 
The main two variables in our study are total US bond flows to developing countries and 
EMBI Sovereign Spread. The data for the first variable was taken from the US Treasury 
Department (TIC: the Treasury’s International Capital Reports) and reconsolidated so as 
to yield an aggregate of [(Asia less Japan)+Africa+(Latin America less Caribbean)]. 
EMBI Sovereign Spread was taken from Bloomberg. The data for explanatory variables 
come from various sources: International Financial Statistics (US Industrial Production 
Index), Bloomberg (US High-yield Spread), US Federal Reserve System (M3 US Money 
Stock, US Federal Funds Rate), and Cross Border Capital (Emerging Market Liquidity 
Index). All data are on a monthly basis from 1993:02 to 2001:12. Table 1 below shows 
the detailed information about the data: 
 
 
  17    Table  1  Data  Description 
Transformation           Mnemonic    Description of the variable 
logTBDC                 LTBDC    Bond Flows to Developing Countries                
Spread_EM/100  Spread_EM   EMBI  Sovereign  Spread 
Spread_HY/100    Spread_HY   US  High-yield  Spread 
σ(Spread_EM)       SD(Spread_EM)        EMBI Sovereign Spread               
∆ Spread_HY                 DSpread_HY             US High-yield Spread       
σ(Spread_HY)                 SD(Spread_HY)        US High-yield Spread 
Spread_HY/σ(Spread_HY)        R(Spread_HY)           Risk Aversion 
∆log(IIP)                 DLIIP               US Industrial Production Index     
∆log(M3)       DLM3               M3 US Money Stock                                   
∆ xt = xt – xt-1    σ(xt) = standard deviation of xt over the previous 12 months 
 
 
Visual examination of the main data trends (see Appendix 2) reveals some of the main 
characteristics accounted for by the model. The extreme variability of monthly bond 
flows (Figure A.1) and yield spreads (Figure A.2) is clear and well known. The bond 
flows have a rising trend into the crisis of the late 1990s, and seem to have stabilised at a 
lower (but still highly volatile) level thereafter. The inverse relationship between yields 
and flows is clear from Figure A.3 where the two graphs are combined.  
 
Our source for risk aversion is the US High-Yield Spread (HYS)
12. This is plotted against 
bond flows in Figure A.4, where the inverse relationship is evident. The direction of 
causality is presumably from the US home market to EM bond flows and spreads, given 
the relative size of the two asset classes. Similarly the direct relationship between HYS 
and EM spread is evident from Figure A.5. In common with other authors (e.g. IMF 
2001; Mody and Taylor, 2002), we interpret this as reflecting changes in risk aversion 
which are shown in both the yield (the price of risk) and the flow (credit rationing). 
 
                                                 
12 The difference between the yield on sub-investment grade (‘junk’) bonds and 10 year US Treasuries. 
  18The exact formulation of the proxy variable for risk aversion from the HYS data is 
complicated. The microeconomic formulation in Kumar and Persaud (2001) would imply 
that the ratio of HYS to its standard deviation would be appropriate, and it is shown in 
Figure A.6. This also has the advantage of reflecting the ‘Sharpe Ratio’ used as a rule of 
thumb by investors,
13 as well as displaying a regular cyclical structure. However, we 
explain below, this proxy for risk aversion does not perform well econometrically. In 
fact, we find as Mody and Taylor (2002) do, that the change in the High-Yield Spread 
gives the best results. 
 
5.2. Methodology and Empirical Results 
 
In our model, since the effect of exogeneous variables on the dependent variables is 
spread over a period of time, we use Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ADL) model. Using 
PcGets (see Hendry and Krolzig, 2001), a general, dynamic, unrestricted, linear model of  
LTBDC and  Spread_EM  
                                                
was constructed that incorporates the variables from the 
theoretical discussion above, and applies a general-to-specific approach in order to 
determine an undominated congruent model. We apply PcGets  to two general, dynamic, 
unrestricted linear models of LTBDC and Spread_EM separately and obtain a congruent 
reduction of  the two mentioned equations. Finally, we take account of the simultaneity of 
LTBDC and Spread_EM by collecting the two equations to Simultaneous Equations 
model and estimate the system by Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) using 
PcGive (Hendry and Doornik, 2001).  
 
 
13 See Caouette, Altman and Narayanan (1998), p.242. 
  19The lag order selected by PcGets is two for the first model and one for the second model 
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Figures in parentheses show estimated standard errors.       
            
           (1) 
Estimation statistics 
RSS      3.9999    σ^   0.21953    R
^2   0.84301    R
adj^2   0.79951 
LogLik 175.8308   AIC   -2.83796    HQ  -2.59492    SC  -2.23845 
T           107    P            24    FpNull    0.00000    FpConst   0.00000 
 
Misspecification tests 
FChow(1997:7)( 54,29)  =  1.880  [0.0342]  Far(1-4)( 4,79)  = 1.685  [0.1617] 
FChow(2001:2)(11,72) =  1.769  [0.0756]  Farch(1-4)( 4,99)  = 0.870  [0.4851] 
χ
2
nd(2)  = 1.945  [0.3781]  Fhet(46,60) = 1.813  [0.0153] 
 
 
Chow tests indicate that the model is structurally stable, with no structural breaks. The 
normality test is only marginally accepted (fat tails), but there is no autocorrelation in the 
error terms. There is some indication of heteroscedasticity, but this is to be expected with 
financial time series.  
 
  20In general, the estimated coefficients of (1) are statistically insignificant and therefore not 
of great interest. Using PcGets reduction process, we eliminate the statistically 
insignificant variables while ensuring that all the information contained in (1) is retained 
in the reduced model. Standard testing procedures are applied to the unrestricted, 
congruent general model in order to arrive at an undominated, parsimonious 
representation of the data, with diagnostic tests to confirm the validity of the reductions 
(see Hendry and Krolzig, 2001). The PcGets model reduction process reduced the 
number of coefficients from 24 to 7 and yields the following ADL model of LTBDC: 
 
Specific, 1993 (2) - 2001 (12) 
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  (2) 
 
Estimation statistics 
RSS      4.6000    σ^   0.2145    R
^2   0.8195    R
adj^2   0.8086 
LogLik 168.3522    AIC   -3.0159   HQ  -2.9450    SC  -2.8411 
T           107    P            7    FpNull 0.0000   FpGUM   0.7612 
 
Diagnostics 
FChow(1997:7)(54,46) =  1.379  [0.1328]  Far(1-4)( 4,96)  = 1.981  [0.1035] 
FChow(2001:2)(11,89) =  1.396  [0.1887]  Farch(1-4)( 4,99)  = 2.065  [0.0911] 
χ
2
nd(2)  = 1.257  [0.5335]         
         
 
The specific model is able to explain 82% of the variation in the capital flows and the F-
test of the specific against the general model rejects only at a marginal rejection 
  21probability of 0.7612, so the reduction cannot be rejected. Figure 1 shows the properties 
of the estimated model (2). The first (upper LHS) and second (upper RHS) graphs 
indicate the fit of the model over time and the fit against the actual values of LTBDC, 
respectively. The third (lower LHS) and fourth (lower RHS) graphs indicate the residuals 
and the squared residuals, respectively. Diagnostic tests confirm that (2) is a valid 
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(3) 
Estimation statistics 
RSS 122.36817    σ^  1.17257   R
^2 0.83761    R
adj^2 0.80659 
LogLik    -7.17999    AIC   0.47065    HQ  0.65293    SC  0.92029 
T            107    P           18    FpNull   0.00000    FpConst 0.00000 
 
Misspecification tests 
FChow(1997:7)(54,34) =  0.704  [0.8777]  Far(1-4)(4,84) = 0.889  [0.4743] 
FChow(2001:2)(11,77) =  1.198  [0.3030]  Farch(1-4)(4,99) = 2.854  [0.0276] 
χ
2
nd(2)  = 7.624  [0.0221]  Fhet(35,71) = 1.863  [0.0134] 
 
There are two potential problems: the Chow test is only marginally accepted, possibly 
due to structural breaks; there is also evidence of heteroscedasticity, although not of the 
ARCH type. A centered impulse dummy, I(1998:8), was included to reflect the very large 




) 02 . 1 (
t
) 244 . 0 (
t
) 237 . 0 (
1 t
) 0436 . 0 ( ) 4 . 2 (
t 8 : 1998 I 7 . 7 HY _ DSpread 64 . 0 LTBDC 659 . 0 EM _ Spread 824 . 0 43 . 7 EM _ Spread + + − + + = −
∧  
           ( 4 )  
 
  23Estimation statistics 
RSS    91.5499    σ^    0.9474    R
^2    0.8785    R
adj^2 0.87374 
LogLik      8.3431    AIC    -0.0625    HQ   -0.0119    SC  0.06241 
T           107    P             5    FpNull     0.0000    FpGUM   0.65903 
 
Misspecification tests 
FChow(1997:7)(54,48) =  0.576  [0.9748]  Far(1-4)(4,98) = 0.6605  [0.6209] 
FChow(2001:2)(11,91) =  0.415  [0.9456]  Farch(1-4)(4,99) = 1.7651  [0.1419] 
 
With only 5 parameters, the model is able to explain 87.9% of the variation in the spread. 
The reduction is accepted at a marginal rejection probability of 0.659. Figure 2 shows the 
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Figure 2.  Model of Spread_EM  
  24The Simultaneous Equations Model 
 
The capital flows and interest rate spread dynamics of the system have so far been 
modelled by analyzing one equation at a time implicitly ignoring the simultaneity of 
equations (2) and (4). Due to the presence of instantaneous causality between LTBDC 
and Spread_EM, a single-equation model reduction approach is generally not efficient 
(Krolzig, 2001). We therefore check the restrictions imposed by PcGets in the previous 
subsection by combining the two equations in a simultaneous equation model 
 
B yt = Γ1 yt-1 + Γ2 xt  + εt, 
 
where yt  = (LTBDC, Spread_EM)΄ and xt  is the vector of the exogenous variables in the 
system. εt is a vector white noise process with E[εt] = Σ. Identification of the structural 
parameters is ensured by the null-restrictions set by PcGets. 
 
FIML estimation
14 of the system yields almost identical parameter estimates (see 
Appendix 1) and a log-likelihood of the system of -128.84561.  The standard error is 
0.95304 in the first and 0.21355 in the second equation, while the correlation of structural 
residuals in the two equation is just 0.14775. The likelihood ratio (LR) test of the 
restrictions imposed by PcGets supports the empirical models (2) and (4): a χ^2(40) =  
40.161 [0.4631] means that we can accept the reduction. The model reduction procedure  
used does not seem to be negatively affected by instantaneous non-causality.  
 
  255.3. Interpretation of the Results 
 
In sum, this method yields the following two statistically robust simultaneous equations 
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In explaining aggregate bond flows, the lagged flow itself is the major explanatory 
variable, with a very high degree of persistence (60 percent) reflecting the widespread 
behaviour of momentum trading. The EM spread itself is significant and of the expected 
(negative) sign, but unexpectedly its standard deviation (to reflect volatility and thus risk) 
was not significant and thus discarded.  
 
Our preferred measure of risk aversion (the ‘Sharpe Ratio’) was discarded as not 
significant either, but the alternative measure (change in U.S. HYS) is significant when 
lagged and of the expected (negative) sign, thus supporting our notion of risk aversion 
and credit rationing – the lag presumably reflecting portfolio adjustment delays. 
However, the outstanding bond stock, which we had included as a proxy for aggregate 
                                                                                                                                                 
14 Using PcGive10 (See Hendry and Doornik, 2001). 
  26debt overhang, did not prove significant, which is unfortunate as this was our main ‘pull’ 
variable reflecting default risk.  
 
Our measures of US wealth are US industrial production (as a proxy for monthly GDP) 
and liquidity (M3). The former was significant and with the correct sign; but the latter 
was not significant and thus discarded. However, although the current Federal Funds rate 
is significant and of the expected (negative) sign, the rate lagged by two months is also 
significant but with a positive sign. This could mean the presence of a difference 
operator
15 which might reflect the influence of changes in the Federal Funds rate at the 
six-weekly meeting of the Open Markets Committee. 
 
The major explanator of yield spreads is lagged yield spread itself, with the expected 
(positive) sign reflecting asset bubbles and a very high degree of persistence (84 percent). 
As expected, bond flows are a significant variable, with the correct (negative) sign. 
Again, as in the case of flows, the change in HYS as a measure of home risk aversion 
itself is significant and has expected (positive) sign.   
 
As in the case of the yields equation, the bond stock was discarded in earlier trials as not 
being significant. However, unlike the case of bond flows where no dummy term had 
been significant, one only was significant in the case of yields – that for the August 1998. 
This was the worst unexpected shock in the whole period: note that dummies did not 
seem significant for the Mexican or East Asian crises. It is of interest to note that the US  
                                                 
15 Of the form (-0.22FedFundst+0.304FedFundst-2). 
  27variables (funds rate, liquidity, output) did not turn out to be significant in explaining the 
yield spread – the effect of these variables being felt on the flow of bonds discussed 
above.  
 
In sum, we have a high degree of persistence in the results, with risk aversion also 
affecting both yields and flows, all of which had been expected. Substituting the yield 
equation into the flow equation, it transpires that the ‘full’ lag coefficient for bond flows 
is of the order of 0.5. The unexpected result was that the two aggregate measures of host 
risk (debt stock and volatility of yields) did not turn out to be significant: this could be 
held to support the notion of two-stage portfolio allocation procedure, with host factors 
affecting country shares within the overall flow. The resulting fits are extremely good, as 
can be seen from Figures 1 and 2. However, the predictive power of the model should not 
be over-estimated: on the one hand, factors such as the US HYS are not forecastable; 
while on the other, the fitted function follows rather than anticipates turning-points. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS  
 
This paper has set out to demonstrate how shifts in the demand schedule for emerging 
market assets affect prices (i.e. yield spreads) and quantities (flows). In doing so we have 
identified a number of points at which the macroeconomics of capital flows and the 
microeconomics of portfolio adjustment can be brought together to better define the key 
components of this demand schedule. We have also tried to establish how shifts in this 
  28demand schedule itself, independently of conditions in emerging markets, account for a 
large part of the changes in observed capital flows in the aggregate.  
 
These are clearly initial results although they are clearly significant. The model could be 
tested on other markets, such as the UK bond flows towards emerging markets, or equity 
flows instead of bonds – although there are data limitations in both cases. The next 
proposed step is to test a similar model on flows to individual emerging markets.
16 This 
would involve including aggregate flows to EMs as a whole in the country-level models 
so as to reflect the two-stage process of portfolio construction. In this process, investors 
allocate funds to emerging markets as an asset class, and then between countries; where 
country characteristics and regional factors determine country shares. 
 
Meanwhile, some tentative policy implications can be derived from our argument so far. 
To the extent that the greater part of the variance of flows and yields is determined by 
conditions within home financial markets, at the very least G3 governments could pay 
more attention to the negative effects on emerging markets of volatility within their own 
capital markets. As the IMF points out, “an approach to monetary policy that provides 
financial markets with clear indications of the US authorities' intentions is likely to 
reduce the impact of a US rate increase on developing countries” (IMF, 2000:68). 
However, the ability of the G3 to stabilise or even predict their macroeconomic cycles is 
clearly limited. Thus other measures in order to stabilise capital flows towards emerging 
markets from the ‘demand perspective’ might be considered. One possibility would be to 
                                                 
16 The authors are currently engaged in this task.  
  29encourage – by a combination of regulatory changes and tax incentives – G3 institutional 
investors to acquire and hold emerging market assets of a longer maturity than at present. 
This would in effect both shift the demand ‘upwards’ and reduce its volatility over the 
cycle by increasing risk appetite on a structural basis. The advantages to institutional 
investors would be higher long-term yields without the excess risk generated by the 
market instability of the past decade.  
 
Another possibility would be to create greater liquidity in the market by encouraging 
‘market makers’ (which could be the international financial institutions themselves or 
coordinated arrangements between regional central banks) to make an explicit 
commitment to counter-cyclical intervention so as to stand ready to buy assets from the 
private sector in the downswing of the cycle (when risk appetite declines) and sell in the 
upswing. This form of provision of liquidity would probably be more effective than the 
present practice of last-resort lending once crises have occurred, particularly since it 
would reduce the ex-ante volatility of emerging market assets and thus enhance their 
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  34APPENDIX 1:  ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
General-to-specific Modelling:  bond flows  
 
Lag-order  preselection              
lags r Diags  LogLik  Radj^2  AIC  HQ  SC  F-prob  max|t|  FpGUM
3  8  0  178.2131  0.7878 -2.7330 -2.4089 -1.9336 0.9014 0.2527  ------ 
2 8  0  175.8308 0.7995+ -2.8380+ -2.5949  -2.2384  0.0241* 0.0696  0.9014 
1 8  0  164.8484 0.7755  -2.7822  -2.6202+ -2.3825+ 0.0000* 0.0000*  0.2021*
0  8  0  121.4851  0.5358 -2.1212 -2.0402 -1.9214  ------  ------  0.0000*
Selected lag order = 2.                   
 
GUM(115) Modelling LTBDC by GETS (using TICS.xls) 
        Estimation sample: 1993 (2) - 2001 (12) 
        Liberal strategy 
 Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob 
LTBDC_1 0.46957 0.10067 4.665 0.0000 
LTBDC_2 0.13457 0.09585 1.404 0.1641 
Spread_EM -0.03363 0.02059 -1.633 0.1063 
Spread_EM_1 -0.03363 0.02899 -1.160 0.2495 
Spread_EM_2 0.00844 0.02448 0.345 0.7312 
Constant 3.50835 0.85195 4.118 0.0001 
SD(Spread_EM) 0.15415 0.12360 1.247 0.2158 
SD(Spread_EM)_1 -0.16109 0.19510 -0.826 0.4114 
SD(Spread_EM)_2 0.05441 0.11230 0.485 0.6293 
R(Spread_HY) 0.00382 0.01031 0.370 0.7122 
R(Spread_HY)_1 0.00297 0.01514 0.196 0.8449 
R(Spread_HY)_2 -0.00266 0.00908 -0.294 0.7698 
DLIIP 0.15041 0.05756 2.613 0.0107 
DLIIP_1 0.06259 0.06719 0.932 0.3542 
DLIIP_2 -0.10868 0.06533 -1.663 0.1000 
FedFunds -0.30269 0.18213 -1.662 0.1003 
FedFunds_1 0.18060 0.27676 0.653 0.5159 
FedFunds_2 0.20988 0.20042 1.047 0.2981 
DLM3 0.02967 0.07771 0.382 0.7036 
DLM3_1 -0.05665 0.08437 -0.671 0.5038 
DLM3_2 0.03465 0.08101 0.428 0.6700 
DSpread_HY -0.00526 0.07052 -0.075 0.9407 
DSpread_HY_1 -0.03017 0.06892 -0.438 0.6627 
DSpread_HY_2 -0.12682 0.06900 -1.838 0.0696 
 
RSS 3.99991    Sigma  0.21953   R^2  0.84301   Radj^2  0.79951
LogLik 175.8308   AIC -2.83796   HQ  -2.59492   SC  -2.23845
T 107    P  24   FpNull 0.00000   FpConst  0.00000
 
   value prob alpha
Chow(1997:7)  F( 54, 29)  1.8797 0.0342 0.0050
Chow(2001:2)  F( 11, 72)  1.7693 0.0756 0.0100
normality test  chi^2(  2)  1.9452 0.3781 0.0100
AR   1-4 test  F(  4, 79)  1.6850 0.1617 0.0100
ARCH 1-4 test  F(  4, 99)  0.8696 0.4851 0.0100
hetero test  F( 46, 60)  1.8131 0.0153 0.0000
  35 
 
MOD(115) Specific model of LTBDC (using TICS.xls) 
        Estimation sample: 1993 (2) - 2001 (12) 
 
 
 Coefficient  Std.Error t-value t-prob Split1  Split2  reliable
LTBDC_1 0.58437  0.06086 9.602 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  1.0000
Spread_EM -0.04839  0.01073 -4.510 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  1.0000
Constant 3.71218  0.55476 6.692 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  1.0000
DLIIP 0.17108  0.04979 3.436 0.0009 0.0051  0.0005  1.0000
FedFunds -0.22773  0.06961 -3.271 0.0015 0.0317  0.0316  1.0000
FedFunds_2 0.31553  0.07654 4.122 0.0001 0.0003  0.0216  1.0000
DSpread_HY_2 -0.15055  0.05515 -2.730 0.0075 0.0003  0.0071  1.0000
 
RSS  4.60001    sigma  0.21448  R^2 0.81946  Radj^2  0.80862 
LogLik 168.35220    AIC  -3.01593   HQ  -2.94504   SC  -2.84107 
T 107    p  7   FpNull 0.00000   FpGUM  0.76122 
 
 
   value prob
Chow(1997:7)  F( 54, 46)  1.3795 0.1328
Chow(2001:2)  F( 11, 89)  1.3961 0.1887
normality test  chi^2(  2)  1.2566 0.5335
AR   1-4 test  F(  4, 96)  1.9809 0.1035
ARCH 1-4 test  F(  4, 99)  2.0654 0.0911
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Lag-order preselection                   
lags r  diags LogLik Radj^2  AIC  HQ  SC  F-prob  max|t| FpGUM 
3  9  0     4.4460  0.8049  0.5898  0.9543  1.4891  0.5801  0.1349  ------ 
2  9  0   -0.9809    0.8084+  0.5230  0.7964  1.1975  0.3781  0.1497  0.5801 
1  9  0   -7.1800  0.8066    0.4707+    0.6529+   0.9203+   0.0000*    0.0000*  0.5163 
0  9  0 -49.2190 0.6146  1.0882  1.1793 1.3130  ------  ------     0.0000* 
  Selected lag order = 1.                  
 
GUM(116) Modelling Spread_EM by GETS (using TICS.xls) 
        Estimation sample: 1993 (2) - 2001 (12) 
        Liberal strategy 
 Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob 
Spread_EM_1 0.75844 0.08846 8.574 0.0000 
Constant 10.10810 4.20204 2.406 0.0182 
SD(Spread_EM) -0.04491 0.55657 -0.081 0.9359 
SD(Spread_EM)_1 0.19069 0.53270 0.358 0.7212 
R(Spread_HY) -0.02408 0.05056 -0.476 0.6350 
R(Spread_HY)_1 0.00692 0.05113 0.135 0.8926 
DLIIP 0.68932 0.29767 2.316 0.0229 
DLIIP_1 -0.35249 0.33914 -1.039 0.3015 
LTBDC -0.49705 0.53538 -0.928 0.3557 
LTBDC_1 -0.48236 0.49472 -0.975 0.3322 
FedFunds -0.46939 0.98319 -0.477 0.6342 
FedFunds_1 0.58802 1.02692 0.573 0.5684 
DLM3 0.10211 0.40357 0.253 0.8008 
DLM3_1 0.05978 0.42778 0.140 0.8892 
DSpread_HY 1.30881 0.31843 4.110 0.0001 
DSpread_HY_1 -0.08188 0.33739 -0.243 0.8088 
LiqEM -0.12194 0.49357 -0.247 0.8054 
LiqEM_1 0.10081 0.48542 0.208 0.8360 
 
RSS 122.36817  sigma  1.17257 R^2  0.83761   Radj^2  0.80659
LogLik -7.17999  AIC  0.47065 HQ  0.65293   SC  0.92029
T 107  p  18 FpNull 0.00000   FpConst  0.00000
 
   value prob alpha 
Chow(1997:7)  F( 54, 34)  0.7038 0.8777 0.0100 
Chow(2001:2)  F( 11, 77)  1.1977 0.3030 0.0100 
normality test  chi^2(  2)  7.6241 0.0221 0.0000 
AR   1-4 test  F(  4, 84)  0.8889 0.4743 0.0100 
ARCH 1-4 test  F(  4, 99)  2.8541 0.0276 0.0050 
hetero test  F( 35, 71)  1.8633 0.0134 0.0000 
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MOD(116) Specific model of Spread_EM (using TICS.xls)   
        Estimation sample: 1993 (2) - 2001 (12)     
 
 Coefficient  Std.Error t-value t-prob Split1 Split2  reliable
Spread_EM_1 0.82430  0.04355 18.926 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  1.0000
Constant 7.43229  2.39856 3.099 0.0025 0.0007 0.0001  1.0000
LTBDC -0.65872  0.23730 -2.776 0.0066 0.0020 0.0003  1.0000
DSpread_HY 0.63981  0.24439 2.618 0.0102 0.0458 0.0046  1.0000
I1998:8 7.70355  1.02383 7.524 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  1.0000
 
RSS 91.54985    sigma  0.94739 R^2  0.87851 Radj^2  0.87374
LogLik 8.34307    AIC  -0.06249 HQ -0.01186 SC  0.06241
T 107    p  5 FpNull 0.00000 FpGUM  0.65903
 
   value prob
Chow(1997:7)  F( 54, 48)  0.5767 0.9748
Chow(2001:2)  F( 11, 91)  0.4159 0.9456
AR   1-4 test  F(  4, 98)  0.6605 0.6209
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Simultaneous Equation Model 
 
MOD( 1) Estimating the model by FIML (using TICS.xls) 
        The estimation sample is: 1993 (2) to 2001 (12) 
 
Equation for: Spread_EM 
 
 Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob 
Spread_EM_1 0.83659 0.04618 18.1 0.000 
Constant 6.44060 2.804 2.30 0.024 
LTBDC -0.561045 0.2786 -2.01 0.047 
DSpread_HY 0.656407 0.2440 2.69 0.009 
I1998:8 7.48811 1.021 7.34 0.000 
sigma = 0.95304         
 
Equation for: LTBDC 
 
 Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob 
LTBDC_1 0.596982 0.05992 9.96 0.000 
Spread_EM -0.0475242 0.01139 -4.17 0.000 
Constant 3.62237 0.5554 6.52 0.000 
DLIIP 0.163324 0.04890 3.34 0.001 
FedFunds -0.222525 0.06853 -3.25 0.002 
FedFunds_2 0.304200 0.07499 4.06 0.000 
DSpread_HY_2 -0.138531 0.05450 -2.54 0.013 
sigma = 0.213547         
 
          
log-likelihood -128.84561 -T/2log|Omega| 174.807236 
no. of observations  107  no. of parameters  12 
 
LR test of over-identifying restrictions: Chi^2(40)=   40.161 [0.4631]   
BFGS using analytical derivatives (eps1=0.0001; eps2=0.005): 
Strong convergence 
 






  39APPENDIX 2: DATA CHARTS 
 
FIGURE .A.1 MONTHLY BOND FLOWS 
 








10.0  LTBDC  
 
FIGURE A.2 EMERGING MARKET YIELD SPREAD 
 










  40FIGURE A.3 BOND FLOWS AND YIELD SPREAD 
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FIGURE A.4 BOND FLOWS AND US HIGH YIELD SPREAD 
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  41FIGURE A.5 EM YIELD SPREAD AND US HIGH YIELD SPREAD 
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FIGURE A.6 A ‘SHARPE RATIO” MEASURE OF RISK AVERSION 
 






30  Risk  Aversion 
HYS/SD(HYS)  
  
  42DATA SOURCES 
 
 
US Bond Flows  US Treasury Department (TIC: Treasury’s International Capital 
Reports) (htpp://www.ustreas.gov) 
 
EMBI Sovereign Spread  Bloomberg     (JPSS PRD) 
            <Index>   
 
US High Yield Spread    Bloomberg    
(calculated as the difference between:   J0A0 - GA10) 
<Index>  <Index>   
 
US Industrial Production Index (seasonally adjusted)    IFS    66..IZF 
 
US Fed Funds Rate  US Federal Reserve System  (htpp://www.federalreserve.gov) 
 
M3 US Money Stock (seasonally adjusted)  US Federal Reserve System
 (htpp://www.federalreserve.gov) 
 
Emerging Market Liquidity Index     Cross Border Capital 
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